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Interests Interests and and Animals, Animals, I I n n Interests Interests and and Rights Rights / / The The Case Case Against Against Animals Animals /1 /1 R. R. G. G. Frey Frey believes believes he he has has animal animal rights rights advocates advocates firmly firmly skewered skewered on on the the horns horns of of a a dilemma: dilemma:
(1) (1) Animal Animal rights rights advocates advocates agree agree that that "all "all and and only only beings beings which which (can) (can) have have interests interests (can) (can) have have moral moral rights. rights. " " Frey Frey labels labels this this "the "the interest interest requirement. requirement. "2 "2 (2) (2) I Interests nterests must must be be divided divided into into needs needs and and desi desi res. res. 3 3 (3) (3)
If If "interests" "interests" in in
(1) (1) refers refers to to needs, needs, then then plants, plants, tractors, tractors, cave cave drawings, drawings, and and other other mere mere things things (can) (can) have have interests interests and and / / consequently consequently / / (can) (can) have have moral moral rights rights (at (at least least as as far far as as the the interest interest requi requi rement rement is is concerned) concerned) . . But But this this is is so so counter-intuitive counter-intuitive as as to to be be unacceptable unacceptable even even to to animal animal rights rights advocates. advocates.
(4) (4)
If If "interests" "interests" in in (1) (1) refers refers to to desires, desires, animals animals can can not not have have them them and, and, conse conse quently quently / / cannot cannot have have moral moral rights. rights.
Animals Animals cannot cannot have have desi desi res res because because (a) (a) having having desires desires requires requires beliefs beliefs or or self-consciousness, self-consciousness, (b) (b) both both of of these these require require linguistic linguistic ability, ability, but but (c) (c) animals animals lack lack linguistic linguistic ability.5 ability.5 Thus, Thus, Frey Frey claims claims that that a a careful careful anal anal ysis ysis of of "interests" "interests" shows shows that that the the claim claim that that animals animals (can) (can) have have moral moral rights rights either either leads leads to to absurdity absurdity or or is is false. false.
Frey Frey is is wrong wrong on on both both counts. counts. If If the the interest interest requirement requirement refers refers to to needs needs / / it it does does not not follow follow that that plants plants / / artifacts, artifacts, and and other other mere mere things things (can) (can) have have moral moral rights, rights, for for plants, plants, arti arti facts/ facts/ etc. etc. / / do do not not have have the the kinds kinds of of needs needs which which generate generate interests. interests.
If If
Needs Needs and and Language Language the the i inte nte rest rest req req u u i irement rement refe refe rs rs to to desires, desires, it it does does not not follow follow that that animals animals cannot cannot have have interests, interests, for for having having desires desires does does not not require require linguistic linguistic ability ability / / since since self-consciousness self-consciousness ity. ity.
neither neither requires requires believing believing this this nor nor abil abil
I. I. Needs Needs
Frey Frey distinguishes distinguishes having having an an inter inter est est from from taking taking an an interest, interest, generally generally using using "need" "need" for for the the former former and and "desire" "desire" for for the the latter. latter. According According to to Frey, Frey, one one has has an an interest interest in in or or needs needs X X if if X X contributes contributes (will (will contribute, contribute, would would contribute) contribute) to to his his good good or or well-being. well-being. One One need need not not care care about about this this relation relation or or even even be be aware aware of of it it for for this this need need to to exist. exist.
For For example, example, one one needs needs vitamin vitamin C C for for good good health health whether whether or or not not one one cares cares about about or or is is even even aware aware of of this. this.
Frey Frey then then goes goes on on to to remind remind us us that that plants, plants, artifacts, artifacts, and and other other mere mere things things can can be be intelli intelli gibly gibly said said to to need need things things ("tractors ("tractors need need oil") oil") / / to to be be harmed harmed or or benefited benefited ("the ("the Rembrandt Rembrandt painting painting would would be be harmed harmed by by exposure exposure to to the the sun")' sun")' to to be be good good of of their their kind kind ("that's ("that's a a good good example example of of a a night night blooming blooming jasmine"), jasmine"), and and to to have have things things that that are are good good for for them them ("a ("a sunny sunny corner corner protected protected from from the the wind wind is is a a good good place place to to plant plant this this kind kind of of shrub"). shrub").
He He concludes concludes from from this this that that if if we we interpret interpret the the interest interest requirement requirement as as referring referring to to having having needs, needs, then then plants, plants, artifacts, artifacts, and and other other mere mere things things (can) (can) have have moral moral rights. rights. 6 6 But But would would we we ordinarily ordinarily say, say, as as Frey Frey does, does, that that "it "it is is in in a a tractor's tractor's interests interests to to be be well-oiled"? well-oiled"? 7 7 I I think think not. not.
While While "need/" "need/" "want/" "want/" "Iack/" "Iack/" "good/" "good/" "harm/" "harm/" and and "benefit" "benefit" are are all all commonly commonly applied applied to to plants, plants, artifacts, artifacts, E&A E&A IV/2 IV/2 etc., etc., "interest" "interest" is is not. not.
"Interest" "Interest" is is ordinarily ordinarily reserved reserved for for the the people people and and other other animals animals who who will will benefit benefit or. or. be be harmed harmed by by the the needs needs of of the the plants, plants, artifacts, artifacts, etc., etc., being being met met or or unmet. unmet. For For example, example, the the tractor tractor "needs "needs oil," oil," but but it it is is "in "in the the farmer's farmer's interest," interest," not not the the tractor's, tractor's, that that his his tractor tractor be be well-oiled. well-oiled.
Again, Again, wheat wheat "needs "needs water" water" to to su su rvive rvive and and flou flou rish, rish, but but it it is is "in "in the the farmer's farmer's interest," interest," not not the the wheat's, wheat's, that that his his wheat wheat be be properly properly watered. watered.
Thus, Thus, the the ordinary ordinary use use of of So, So, "having "having a a good good of of one's one's own," own," "being "being capable capable of of being being benefited benefited or or harmed," harmed," or, or, sim sim ply, ply, "having "having a a need" need" does does not not provide provide an an adequate adequate analysis analysis of of having having an an interest. interest.
Consequently, Consequently, by by basing basing the the reductio reductio in in his his dilemma dilemma on on inter inter preting preting having having an an interest interest as as having having a a need, need, Frey Frey has has refuted refuted a a strawman. strawman.
Setting Setting aside aside special special legal legal and and eco eco nomic nomic meanings meanings of of "having "having an an inter inter est," est," I I would would offer offer the the following following as as a a more more adequate adequate interpretation interpretation of of that that concept: concept: P P has has an an interest interest in in X X if if and and only only if if X X affects affects (will (will affect, affect, would would affect) affect) P's P's feelings feelings of of well-be well-be ing. ing. I I understand understand "feelings "feelings of of well well being" being" to to refer refer to to such such feelings feelings as as pleasure pleasure and and pain, pain, feeling feeling well well and and feeling feeling ill, ill, elation elation and and depression, depression, feelings feelings of of fulfillment fulfillment and and of of frustra frustra tion, tion, and and the the many many other other feelings feelings which which contribute contribute to to or or detract detract from from the the enjoyment enjoyment of of or or satisfaction satisfaction with with life. life. 8 8 This This interpretation interpretation can can readily readily explain explain why why people people can can unknowingly unknowingly have have an an interest interest in in vitamin vitamin C, C, trac trac tors tors being being well-oiled, well-oiled, and and wheat wheat being being properly properly watered, watered, while while plants, plants, arti arti facts, facts, and and other other non-feeling non-feeling things things cannot cannot have have an an interest interest in in anything. anything. Furthermore, Furthermore, distinguishing distinguishing affective affective needs, needs, which which generate generate interests, interests, from from non-affective non-affective needs, needs, which which do do not not 39 39 generate generate interests, interests, can can explain explain why why some some people people do do not not even even have have an an interest interest (and, (and, consequently, consequently , justifia justifia bly bly take take no no interest) interest) in in some some things things they they can can properly properly be be said said to to need. need. For For example, example, suppose suppose that that I I am am defi defi nitely nitely overweight overweight and and would would need need to to exercise exercise regularly regularly and and watch watch my my diet diet in in order order to to slim slim down down but but that that I I do do not not mind mind being being fat fat and and that that my my over over all all enjoyment enjoyment of of life life will will not not be be dimin' dimin' ished ished by by my my being being fat. fat.
Perhaps Perhaps my my being being fat fat prevents prevents me me from from engaging engaging in in certain certain activities activities I I would would have have enjoyed enjoyed and and will will shorten shorten my my life life some some what, what, but but is is is is also also an an important important con con tributor tributor to to my my happiness, happiness, since since my my fine fine tenor tenor voice, voice, which which I I love love and and from from which which I I profit profit handsomely, handsomely, could could not not be be as as fine fine without without the the fat fat and and since since the the crowd crowd I I go go with with and and whose whose company company I I greatly greatly enjoy enjoy feels feels more more at at ease ease and and jolly jolly with with fat fat people. people.
Fur Fur thermore, thermore, exercising exercising and and dieting dieting might might be be highly highly unpleasant unpleasant for for me me and and would would certainly certainly deprive deprive me me of of one one of of my my dearest dearest pleasures, pleasures, eating eating with with aban aban don. don.
I I n n this this way, way, being being fat fat might might give give me me a a somewhat somewhat shorter shorter but but over-all over-all happier happier life life than than would would being being slim. slim. In In this this case, case, although although it it might might be be good good for for me me to to lose.weight lose.weight (i.e., (i.e., be be "good "good for for my my health" health" or or "necessary "necessary for for good good health"), health"), I I could could properly properly claim claim that that it it is is not not in in my my interest interest to to spend spend my my time time exercising exercising and and watch watch ing ing my my diet. diet.
It It is is in in my my interest interest to to spend spend my my time time fulfilling fulfilling those those needs needs which which will will enhance enhance my my enjoyment enjoyment of of life life and and to to neglect neglect those those needs needs which which will will not. not.
Pursuing Pursuing good good health health is is usually usually in in one's one's interest, interest, since since good good health health is is important important for for one's one's feelings feelings of of well-being, well-being, but but when when that that pursuit pursuit undermines undermines those those feelings, feelings, it it ceases ceases to to be be in in one's one's interest. interest.
Thus, Thus, not not merely merely whether whether one one needs needs X X but but whether whether X X will will affect affect one's one's feelings feelings of of well-being well-being seems seems to to be be the the crucial crucial factor factor in in having having an an interest interest in in X. X. Applying Applying this this more more adequate adequate inter inter pretation pretation of of having having an an interest interest to to the the Further Further more, more, since since Frey Frey acknowledges acknowledges that that some some animals animals can can at at least least "suffer "suffer unpleasant unpleasant sensations," sensations," 1 1 D D it it would would seem seem to to follow follow that that he he must must agree agree that that some some animals animals have have affective affective needs needs and, and, consequently, consequently, have have interests interests and and meet meet the the interest interest requirement requirement for for hav hav ing ing moral moral rights. rights.
II. II. Desires Desires
Frey Frey draws draws a a distinction distinction between between desires desires which which req'uire req'uire beliefs beliefs such such as as "I "I don't don't have have X," X," "I "I would would be be better better off off if if I I had had X," X," and and "in "in order order to to get get X, X, I I have have to to do do Y" Y" and and "simple "simple desires," desires," such such as as wanting wanting food, food, which which are are reflexive reflexive and and cannot, cannot, therefore, therefore, involve involve the the mediation mediation of of beliefs, beliefs, although although having having any any such such simple simple desires, desires, he he insists, insists, requires requires that that at at least least some some of of one's one's simple simple desires desires involve involve self-consciousness. self-consciousness. Frey Frey then then argues argues that that animals animals cannot cannot have have desires desires of of either either sort, sort, for for both both believing believing and and self-consciousness self-consciousness requi requi re re language, language, and and animals animals are are incapable incapable of of using using language. language. (2) what what one one bel bel ieves ieves is is that that some some thing thing is is true true (or (or false), false), and and sen sen tences tences are are the the sorts sorts of of things things that that are are true true (or (or false). false).
Both Both of of these these argu argu ments ments are are seriously seriously faulty. faulty.
(1) (1) Which Which grammatical grammatical forms forms are are employed employed in in expressing expressing the the objects objects of of intentional intentional verbs verbs is is one one issue; issue; what what those those intentional intentional objects objects are are is is another another issue, issue, and and an an answer answer for for the the fi fi rst rst issue issue is is no no more more an an answer answer for for the the second second issue issue than than linguistics linguistics is is a a sub sub stitute stitute for for psychology. psychology.
The The proper proper conclusion conclusion of of Frey's Frey's analysis analysis of of belief belief statements statements is is that that in in order order to to under under stand stand such such statements, statements, one one must must be be able able to to understand understand sentences. sentences. This This conclusion conclusion is is neither neither controversial controversial nor nor relevant relevant to to the the issue issue of of whether whether ani ani mals mals can can believe: believe: it it is is relevant relevant only only to to whether whether animals animals can can formulate formulate or or respond respond to to belief belief statements. statements.
Furthermore, Furthermore, using using intentional intentional verbs verbs whose whose objects objects are are sentences sentences in in referring referring to to and and describing describing animals animals is is a a common common practice. practice. We We commonly commonly say say 41 41 E&A E&A IV/2 IV/2 such such things things as as "the "the dog dog thin thin ks ks the the cat cat is is in in the the tree," tree," "the "the bird bird realized realized that that one one of of its its chicks chicks is is missing," missing,"
"the "the cat cat recognizes recognizes that that the the ice ice is is slippery," slippery," "the "the monkey monkey sees sees that that strangers strangers are are invading invading his his territory," territory," " " the the deer deer senses senses that that we we are are closing closing in in on on it," it," "the "the zebra zebra smells smells that that a a leopard leopard is is near," near," and and "the "the horse horse hears hears that that it it is is being being called." called."
In In saying saying such such things things we we do do not not presume presume that that the the dog, dog, for for example, example, thinks thinks of of the the sentence sentence "the "the cat cat is is in in the the tree" tree" or or that that it it cou cou Id Id assent assent to to that that sen sen tence, tence, if if asked asked whether whether it it is is true. true. Nonetheless, Nonetheless, we we understand understand the the above above sentences, sentences, know know when when they they do do and and do do not not apply, apply, and, and, in in general, general, use use them them without without problem. problem. Thus, Thus, ordinary ordinary lan lan guage guage does does not not support support Frey's Frey's con con tention tention that that if if an an intentional intentional verb verb takes takes a a sentence sentence for for its its object, object, then then it it properly properly applies applies only only to to those those capa capa ble ble of of understanding understanding sentences. sentences. 13 13 Frey Frey might might counter counter that that this this just just shows shows how how pervasive pervasive is is the the pro-animal pro-animal prejudice. prejudice.
However, However, such such a a claim claim reminds reminds one one of of the the band band member member who who claims claims that that he's he's okay; okay; it's it's the the rest rest of of the the band band that's that's out out of of step. step. If If ordi ordi nary nary language language philosophy philosophy has has taught taught us us anything, anything, it it has has taught taught us us which which to to choose choose when when we we have have to to choose choose between between ordinary ordinary language language being being non non sensical sensical and and a a philosophical philosophical analysis analysis being being mistaken. mistaken. 14 14
Another Another problem problem with with Frey's Frey's argu argu ment ment is is that that if if we we were were to to apply apply his his pattern pattern of of analysis analysis to to other other intentional intentional verbs, verbs, we we would would arrive arrive at at the the follow follow ing ing reductio reductio of of his his position: position: just just as as animals animals are are incapable incapable of of belief, belief, they they are are incapable incapable of of hearing, hearing, for for when when I I hear hear that that someone someone is is coming, coming, what what I I hear hear is is that that the the sentence sentence "someone "someone is is coming" coming" is is true, true, but but animals animals are are not not capable capable of of doing doing this. this. Again, Again, animals animals cannot cannot smell, smell, for for when when I I smell smell that that something something is is burning, burning, what what I I smell smell is is that that the the sentence sentence "something "something is is burn burn ing" ing" is is true, true, and and animals animals cannot cannot formulate formulate or or understand understand sentences. sentences. Such Such conclusions conclusions seem seem either either to to be be preposterous preposterous or or to to indicate indicate that that stipu stipu lative lative definitions definitions of of "hear," "hear," "smell," "smell," and and "believe" "believe" are are being being used. used. Such Such abnormal abnormal definitions definitions could could be be based based on on what what Malcolm Malcolm has has described described as as "the "the prejudice prejudice of of philosophers philosophers that that only only propositional propositional thoughts thoughts belong belong to to con con sciousness. sciousness. "15 "15 It It might might be be thought thought that that Frey Frey is is not not really really faced faced with with the the preceding preceding dilemma, dilemma, for for he he does does not not claim claim that that his his analysis analysis applies applies to to all all intentional intentional verbs. verbs.
However, However, nothing nothing in in what what Frey Frey says says indicates indicates that that his his analysis analysis is is restricted restricted to to believing. believing. Since Since per per ceptions, ceptions, like like beliefs, beliefs, can can be be true true or or false false and and since since "hear "hear that," that," "see "see that," that,"
etc., etc., can can be be parsed parsed like like "believe "believe that" that" to to take take sentences sentences as as their their objects, objects, it it would would be be arbitrary arbitrary to to try try to to escape escape the the problems problems of of the the previous previous paragraph paragraph by by insisting insisting that that Frey's Frey's analysis analysis applies applies only only to to believ believ ing. ing.
Finally, Finally, it it may may be be thought thought that that Frey Frey can can escape escape all all the the preceding preceding objections, objections, since since he he claims claims that that though though it it may may be be thought thought that that my my analysis analysis of of belief belief requires requires persons persons to to entertain entertain the the con con cept cept of of a a sentence sentence in in order order to to have have beliefs, beliefs, this this in in fact fact is is not not the the case. case. . . . . . . The The sentence sentence 'John 'John believes believes that that the the window window is is open' open' . . . . . . can can be be plausibly plausibly interpreted interpreted as as 'John 'John would, would, if if asked, asked, assent assent to to some some sentence sentence that that has has for for him him the the meaning meaning that that "the "the window window is is open" open" has has for for us'. us'. 16 16 One One obvious obvious objection objection to to Frey's Frey's con con tention tention that that being being able able to' to' formulate formulate sentences sentences is is essential essential for for believing believing is is that that we we often often believe believe things things without without formulating formulating any any sentences sentences about about them. them. For For example, example, if if I I reach reach into into my my pocket pocket for for a a pencil pencil while while listening listening to to a a lec lec ture, ture, I I believe believe that that I I have have a a pencil pencil in in my my pocket, pocket, but but I I do do not not formulate formulate the the sentence sentence "I "I have have a a pencil pencil in in my my pocket. pocket. " " Frey Frey formulates formulates the the above above interpretation interpretation to to meet meet this this objection. objection. This This interpretation interpretation is is not not relevant relevant to to the the objections objections raised raised so so far far in in this this paper. paper. Just Just as as we we can can believe believe with with out out entertaining entertaining sentences, sentences, so so we we can can hear, hear, see, see, recognize, recognize, realize, realize, etc., etc., without without entertaining entertaining sentences. sentences.
So, So, since since these these intentional intentional verbs verbs take take sentences sentences as as thei thei r r objects, objects, they, they, too, too, presumably, presumably, are are to to be be interpreted interpreted in in terms terms of of what what sentences sentences the the one one who who hears, hears, sees, sees, recognizes, recognizes, realizes, realizes, etc., etc., would would assent assent to. to. Consequently, Consequently, these these verbs verbs would would still still not not be be applica applica ble ble to to infants, infants, animals, animals, and and other other non-language non-language users. users. As As long long as as Frey Frey holds holds that that these these verbs verbs properly properly apply apply only only to to language language users, users, whether whether he he maintains maintains that that they they apply apply only only when when we we entertain entertain sentences sentences or or can can apply apply as as well well to to situations situations where where we we would would assent assent to to sentences sentences is is unimportant. unimportant. Either Either way, way, Frey's Frey's analysis analysis still still runs runs counter counter to to ordinary ordinary usage usage and and is is vulnerable vulnerable to to the the above above reductio. reductio.
As As to to whether whether Frey's Frey's interpretation interpretation provides provides an an answer answer to to the the forceful forceful objection objection that that psychology psychology does does not not reveal reveal an an essential essential relation relation between between believing believing and and sentences, sentences, the the interpre interpre tation tation does does not not meet meet that that objection, objection, either. either.
First, First, the the interpretation interpretation is is arbitrary. arbitrary. "John "John would would assent assent to to the the sentence sentence 'the 'the window window is is open'" open'" is is only only one one among among many many candidates candidates to to be be a a dispositional dispositional interpretation interpretation of of "John "John believes believes that that the the window window is is open." open." Other Other possible possible candidates candidates are are "John "John would would close close the the window, window, if if asked," asked," "John "John would would close close the the window, window, if if he he felt felt there there was was a a draft," draft," "John "John would would th th row row something something out out the the window window with with out out attempting attempting to to open open it, it, if if he he was was called called upon upon to to throw throw something something out out the the window," window," "John "John would would not not sit sit near near the the window, window, if if he he was was afraid afraid of of sitting sitting near near open open windows," windows," and and so so forth. forth.
Frey Frey provides provides no no reason reason for for
selecting selecting what what John John would would assent assent to to as as the the interpretation interpretation of of "John "John believes believes that that the the window window is is open" open" rather rather than than any any or or all all of of these these other other things things he he would would do do if if he he believed believed that. that. But But without without such such an an argument, argument, it it is is not not obvious obvious that that what what someone someone would would assent assent to to is is even even a a necessary necessary part part of of an an interpretation, interpretation, let let alone alone the the inter inter pretation, pretation, of of believing. believing.
We We do do not not commonly commonly require require that that an an individual individual assent assent to to or or even even be be willing willing to to assent assent to to "p" "p" in in order order that that we we feel feel we we have have satisfactory satisfactory evidence evidence that that he he believes believes p. p. We We often often just just watch watch what what a a person person does does to to find find out out what what he he believes, believes, and and we we hold hold that that "actions "actions speak speak louder louder than than words" words" in in expressing expressing beliefs. beliefs. Even Even if if a a subjunctive subjunctive reference reference to to action action is is a a necessary necessary part part of of an an ade ade quate quate understanding understanding of of belief, belief, that that reference reference must must be be vague, vague, for for there there are are many many alternative alternative sets sets of of actions actions which which would would commonly commonly be be considered considered sufficient sufficient to to confirm confirm belief. belief.
Common Common experience experience with with beliefs beliefs does does not not indi indi cate cate that that there there is is any any particular particular form form of of action, action, including including assenting assenting to to sen sen tences, tences, which which one one must must be be ready ready to to perform perform in in order order to to believe believe something. something. I I would would guess guess that that it it is is Frey's Frey's belief belief that that language language is is necessary necessary for for believ believ i ing ng that that leads leads him him to to interpret interpret believ believ ing ing in in terms terms of of assenting, assenting, but, but, of of cou cou rse, rse, that that bel bel ief ief begs begs the the question. question.
Fu Fu rthermore, rthermore, it it is is not not obvious obvious that that "John "John would, would, if if asked, asked, assent assent to to the the sentence sentence 'the 'the window window is is open'" open'" is is properly properly described described as as an an interpreta interpreta tion tion of of "John "John believes believes that that the the window window is is open." open."
If If the the former former were were an an interpretation interpretation of of the the latter, latter, then then "John "John believes believes that that the the window window is is open open but but would would not not assent assent to to the the sen sen tence tence 'the 'the window window is is open'" open'" would would be be self-contradictory. self-contradictory.
But But it it is is not. not. Rather, Rather, it it is is an an instance instance of of the the com com mon mon idea idea "he "he believes believes that, that, but but would would never never admit admit it." it."
Of Of course, course, Frey Frey might might try try to to meet meet this this sort sort of of objec objec tion tion by by qualifying qualifying his his interpretation interpretation of of "John "John believes believes that that the the window window is is E&A E&A IVj2 IVj2 open" open" to to read read something something like like "John "John would would assent assent to to a a sentence sentence that that has has for for him him the the meaning meaning 'the 'the window window is is open' open' has has for for us, us, if if as as ked ked under under con con ditions ditions where where he he felt felt he he had had nothing nothing to to gain gain th th rough rough deception, deception, did did not not feel feel like like playing playing a a practical practical joke, joke, felt felt secure secure in in disclosing disclosing what what he he believed, believed, etc." etc." However, However, the the effect effect of of adding adding such such a a ceteris ceteris paribus paribus clause clause to to Frey's Frey's interpretation interpretation would would be be to to show show just just how how distant distant is is the the relation relation between between believing believing and and assenting. assenting. Such Such a a ceteris ceteris paribus paribus clause clause appro appro priately priately qualifies qualifies the the relation relation between between something something and and a a sign sign of of it, it, not not the the relation relation between between something something and and its its i interp nterp retation. retation. If If Frey Frey were were correct, correct, citing citing John's John's belief belief in in response response to to "Why "Why would would John John assent assent to to 'the 'the window window is is open'?" open'?" would would con con tain tain the the same same category category mistake mistake as as answering answering "Why "Why is is John John a a bachelor?" bachelor?" with with "John "John is is a a bachelor bachelor because because he he is is an an unmarried unmarried male." male."
However, However, that that John John believes believes that that the the window window is is open open does does provide provide a a significant significant answer answer to to the the question question "Why "Why would would John John assent assent to to 'the 'the window window is is open open '?" '?"
As As an an explanation explanation of of why why John John would would assent assent to to that that sentence, sentence, that that Joh Joh n n bel bel ieves ieves that that the the window window is is open open is is in in the the same same group group as as the the following: following: John John wants wants to to please please you you and and feels feels that that by by assenting assenting to to that that sentence sentence he he will will do do so; so; Joh Joh n n was was told told that that he he wi wi II II be be set set free free if if he he assents assents to to that that sentence; sentence; John John figu figu res res that that he he can can fool fool you you by by assenting assenting to to that that sentence; sentence; John John thinks thinks he he can can ridicule ridicule your your research research by by assenting assenting to to that that sentence; sentence; and and many many other other plausible, plausible, common common expla expla nations nations of of why why people people assent assent to to sen sen tences. tences.
That That John John believes believes that that the the window window is is open open may may be be the the explanation explanation for for his his willingness willingness to to assent assent to to "the "the window window is is open" open" which which we we presume presume to to be be the the correct correct one one in in most most cases, cases, which which is is why why we we presume presume assenting assenting is is ordinarily ordinarily a a reliable reliable sign sign of of belief. belief. However, However, that that priority priority of of place place among among explanations explanations does does not not change change the the rela rela tion tion between between believing believing and and willingness willingness to to assent assent into into one one of of interpretation. interpretation.
The The problem problem with with Frey's Frey's interpre interpre tation tation of of "John "John believes believes that that p" p" as as "John "John would would assent assent to to 'p' 'p' under under cer cer tain tain conditions" conditions" is is that that it it tries tries to to pass pass off off a a subjunctive subjunctive reference reference to to one one thing thing belief belief can can lead lead to to as as an an inter inter pretation pretation of of what what belief belief is. is.
But But since, since, for for the the reasons reasons just just developed, developed, believing believing that that p p cannot cannot be be identified identified with with the the fact fact that that one one would would assent assent to to "p" "p" under under certain certain conditions, conditions, Frey Frey has has no no more more succeeded succeeded in in providing providing us us an an interpretation interpretation of of believing believing here here that that Euthyphro Euthyphro succeeded succeeded in in providing providing Socrates Socrates with with an an interpretation interpretation of of piety piety when when he he told told him him that that pious pious men men a a re re beloved beloved of of the the gods gods (and (and Euthyphro's Euthyphro's mistake mistake would would not not be be cor cor rected rected by by substituting substituting "would "would be" be" for for "are" "are" in in his his interpretation interpretation of of piety). piety).
Thus, Thus, Frey's Frey's proposed proposed interpreta interpreta tion tion fails, fails, leaving leaving his his contention contention that that believing believing requires requires linguistic linguistic ability ability vulnerable vulnerable to to the the many many counter-exam counter-exam ples ples of of believing believing without without using using lan lan guage. guage.
Both Both our our experience experience of of our our own own believings believings and and our our commonly, commonly, significantly significantly applying applying "believe" "believe" and and many many other other intentional intentional verbs verbs to to infants, infants, animals, animals, and and other other non-lan non-lan guage guage users users indicate indicate that that the the fact fact that that these these verbs verbs take take sentences sentences as as thei thei r r objects objects does does not not show show that that only only those those capable capable of of recognizing recognizing sentences sentences can can have have those those verbs verbs meaningfully meaningfully applied applied to to them. them.
(2) (2) Frey Frey maintains maintains that that his his analy analy sis sis is is correct correct because because we we would would have have to to "credit "credit [animals] [animals] with with language language in in order order for for there there to to be be something something true true or or false false in in belief," belief," since since "sentences "sentences are are the the sorts sorts of of things things which which [are] [are] capable capable of of being being true true or or false, false, [whereas] [whereas] states states of of affairs affairs are are not not true true or or false false but but are are or or are are not not the the case. case. "17 "17 Setting Setting aside aside the the issue issue of of whether whether animals animals possess possess sufficient sufficient language language or or something something sufficiently sufficiently language-like language-like to to satisfy satisfy this this argument argument without without dispute, dispute, this this argument argument still still suffers suffers from from the the following following problems. problems.
First, First, validly validly inferring inferring from from beliefs beliefs involving involving truth truth and and falsity falsity to to beliefs beliefs involving involving sentences sentences requires requires the the addi addi tional tional premise premise that that only only sentences sentences can can be be true true or or false. false. This This is is clearly clearly false. false.
Currency, Currency, portraits, portraits, friends, friends, signs, signs, omens, omens, impressions, impressions, percep percep tions, tions, examples, examples, tools, tools, and and lines lines are are examples examples which which come come readily readily to to mind mind of of other other things things that that can can be be true true or or false. false.
Thus, Thus, Frey's Frey's argument argument rests rests on on a a false false premise. premise.
It It might might be be countered countered that that this this objection objection equivocates, equivocates, since since the the above above examples examples are are not not all all true true or or false false in in the the same same way. way.
But But such such a a counter counter argument argument would would just just complicate complicate the the objection objection a a bit: bit: if if different different kinds kinds of of things things can can be be true true or or false false in in differ differ ent ent ways, ways, then then (a) (a) are are beliefs beliefs true/ true/ false false in in the the way way sentences sentences are are true/ true/ false, false, and and (b) (b) are are sentences sentences the the only only things things which which are are true/false true/false in in the the way way sentences sentences are are true/false? true/false? If If the the ans ans wer wer to to either either of of these these questions questions is is "no," "no," Frey's Frey's argument argument still still fails, fails, since since his his presumption presumption of of a a very very tight tight rela rela tion tion between between sentences sentences and and being being true/false true/false (in (in the the relevant relevant sense) sense) will will be be false. false.
Frey Frey does does not not seem seem to to have have recognized recognized there there is is an an issue issue here, here, for for he he provides provides no no argument argument to to answer answer E&A E&A IV/2 IV/2 these these questions. questions.
Fu Fu rthermore, rthermore, the the answer answer to to ques ques tion tion (b) (b) seems seems to to be be negative; negative; i.e., i.e., sentences sentences do do not not seem seem to to be be the the only only things things that that are are true/false true/false in in the the way way sentences sentences are are true/false. true/false. If If we we accept accept a a correspondence correspondence theory theory of of truth truth for for sentences, sentences, then then portraits portraits are are true/false true/false in in the the way way sentences sentences are. are. If If we we adopt adopt a a coherence coherence theory theory of of truth truth for for sentences, sentences, then then omens, omens, impressions, impressions, and and perceptions perceptions are are true/false true/false in in the the way way sentences sentences are. are. If If we we adopt adopt a a pragmatic pragmatic theory theory of of truth truth for for sentences, sentences, then then examples, examples, tools, tools, and and signs signs are are true/false true/false in in the the way way sentences sentences are. are.
Thus, Thus, there there would would seem seem to to be be sets sets of of things things which which are are true/false true/false in in the the way way sentences sentences are are true/false. true/false.
Beliefs Beliefs may may be be just just another another kind kind of of thing thing that that is is true/ true/ false false in in that that way. way. So, So, even even if if beliefs beliefs are are true/false true/false in in the the way way sentences sentences are, are, one one cannot cannot infer infer from from that that that that beliefs beliefs are are about about sentences. sentences.
Second, Second, if if we we were were told told that that X X and and Yare Yare both both colored colored or or both both conduct conduct electricity electricity or or are are both both beautiful beautiful or or are are both both complex, complex, it it would would remain remain an an open open question question as as to to just just how how similar similar or or dis dis similar similar they they were were and and in in what what sense(s) sense(s) they they were were or or were were not not the the same same kind kind of of thing. thing. In In Frey's Frey's argu argu ment, ment, however, however, it it is is presumed presumed that that if if X X and and Y Y can can both both be be true/false, true/false, that that shows shows that that they they are are the the same same sort sort of of thing: thing:
he he argues argues that that since since what what is is believed believed is is that that something something is is true true and and since since sentences sentences can can be be true, true, the the something something that that is is believed believed to to be be true true must must be be a a sentence. sentence. But But just just as as one one swallow swallow does does not not make make a a summer, summer, so so having having one one predicate predicate in in common common pro pro vides vides only only minimal minimal evidence evidence concerning concerning in in which which way(s) way(s) or or to to what what degree degree those those things things are are or or are are not not the the same same kind kind of of thing. thing. Frey's Frey's argument argument from from having having the the same same kind kind of of predicate predicate to to being being the the same same kind kind of of thing thing runs runs dangers dangers analogous analogous to to those those in in infer infer ring ring from from similar similar effects effects to to similar similar 45 45 E&A E&A IV/2 IV/2 causes; causes; consequently, consequently, that that argument argument requires requires a a great great deal deal of of confirmation confirmation from from other other arguments. arguments. Frey Frey does does not not provide provide such such confi confi rmation, rmation, nor, nor, as as the the previous previous objections objections to to his his analysis analysis indicate, indicate, is is there there reason reason to to believe believe that that he he could could find find such such confi confi rmation. rmation.
Third, Third, in in the the course course of of developing developing his his argument, argument, Frey Frey provides provides counter counter examples examples to to that that argument. argument. Frey Frey uses uses such such ph ph rases rases as as "the "the false false belief," belief," "true "true and and false false beliefs," beliefs," and and "regard "regard ing ing one one [belief] [belief] but but not not the the other other as as true." true." 18 18 Frey Frey here here predicates predicates "true" "true" and and "false" "false" of of beliefs beliefs themselves, themselves, rather rather than than predicating predicating these these terms terms of of the the something something that that is is believed. believed.
In In making making such such predications predications he he follows follows ordinary ordinary usage, usage, since since we we do do commonly commonly talk talk about about true true and and false false beliefs, beliefs, even even more more commonly commonly than than we we tal tal k k about about what what is is believed believed being being that that something something is is true true or or false. false.
However, However, it it would would seem seem to to follow follow from from Frey's Frey's argument argument that that since since beliefs beliefs can can be be true/false, true/false, they they are are sentences, sentences, since since "sentences "sentences are are the the sorts sorts of of things things which which [are] [are] capable capable of of being being true true or or false." false." This This amounts amounts to to another another reductio reductio of of Frey's Frey's analysis, analysis, since since saying saying that that beliefs beliefs are are sentences sentences clearly clearly confuses confuses the the psy psy chological chological with with the the linguistic. linguistic. 19 19 Finally, Finally, even even if if we we were were to to try try to to decide decide whether whether what what is is believed believed does does or or does does not not concern concern sentences sentences on on the the basis basis of of how how certain certain predicates predicates are are commonly commonly deployed deployed when when discussing discussing beliefs, beliefs, at at least least as as good good and and probably probably even even a a better better case case can can be be made made for for saying saying that that what what is is believed believed is is that that certain certain states states of of affairs affairs are are the the case case than than for for saying saying that that what what is is believed believed is is that that certain certain sentences sentences are are true. true. We We can can equally equally well well say say either either "what "what is is believed believed is is true" true" or or "what "what is is believed believed is is the the case." case."
Again, Again, in in response response to to a a question question like like "Does "Does he he really really believe believe that?," that?," we we can can equally equally well well respond respond "yes, "yes, he he bel bel ieves ieves that that that that is is true" true" or or "yes, "yes, he he believes believes that that that that is is the the case." case." Additionally, Additionally, if if we we were were to to ask ask "What "What makes makes a a belief belief true? true? ," ," the the common common answer answer would would not not be be "a "a belief belief is is true The The place place of of truth truth and and falsity falsity in in the the anal anal ysis ysis of of beliefs, beliefs, belief belief statements, statements, and and statements statements and and questions questions about about beliefs beliefs is is at at least least not not as as clear clear as as and and proba proba bly bly other other than than Frey Frey suggests suggests and and his his argument argument requires. requires.
Thus, Thus, Frey Frey fails fails to to demonstrate demonstrate that that language language is is required required for for belief belief and, and, consequently, consequently, fails fails to to demon demon strate strate that that animals animals cannot cannot have have belief-mediated belief-mediated desi desi res. res.
Tu Tu rning rning to to simple simple desi desi res, res, sllch sllch as as wanting wanting food, food, Frey Frey presents presents the the fol fol lowing lowing argument argument to to show show that that the the self-consciousness self-consciousness required required for for having having such such desires desires requires requires linguistic linguistic abil abil ity: ity: I I adopt adopt the the view view that that 'P-predi 'P-predi cates', cates', which which include include such such things things as as thoughts, thoughts, feelings, feelings, memories, memories, and and perceptions, perceptions, can can only only be be ascribed ascribed to to oneself oneself if if they they can can be be ascribed ascribed to to others others and and that that one one can can know know one one has has or or experiences experiences a a particular particular P-predicate P-predicate R R only only if if one one can can know know that that other other people people have have or or experience experience R. R.
And And following following Wittgenstein's Wittgenstein's private private language language argument, argument, I I adopt adopt the the view view that that P-predicate P-predicate R, R, for for exam exam ple ple 'pain', 'pain', does does not not (and (and can can not) not) have have meaning meaning by by standing standing for for or or naming naming a a sensation sensation to to which which each each of of us us has has access access in in his his own own case· case· but but rather rather has has meaning meaning in in virtue virtue of of certain certain public public rules rules and and conventions conventions which which can can be be adhered adhered to to and and transgressed, transgressed, where where adherence adherence and and transgression transgression can can be be pub pub licly licly checked. checked. In In this this way, way, I I come come with with Hacker Hacker to to the the view view that that the the meaningful meaningful ascription ascription of of P-predicate P-predicate R R to to oneself oneself is is only only possible possible . . . . . . within within the the context context and and confines confines of of a a pub pub lic lic language. language. 7. 7. U U The The problem problem with with this this argument argument is is that that it it begs begs the the question. question.
Frey Frey infers infers from from Wittgenstein's Wittgenstein's argument argument against against a a private private language language that that self self consciousness consciousness requires requires knowing knowing a a public public language. language. However, However, before before Frey's Frey's argument argument that that ascribing ascribing P-predicates P-predicates to to oneself oneself requires requires know know ing ing a a public public language language even even becomes becomes relevant relevant to to whether whether animals animals can can have have simple simple desires, desires, an an argument argument is is needed needed to to show show that that feeling feeling pain, pain, to to use use Frey's Frey's example, example, is is ascribing ascribing the the P-predicate P-predicate "pain" "pain" to to oneself. oneself.
That That is, is, an an argument argument is is needed needed to to show show that that self-consciousness self-consciousness is is properly properly interpreted interpreted as as the the linguistic linguistic activity activity of of ascribing ascribing certain certain predicates predicates to to one one self. self.
Psychology Psychology does does not not support support a a lin lin guistic guistic interpretation interpretation of of self-con self-con sciousness. sciousness.
When When I I h h it it my my thumb thumb with with the the hammer, hammer, I I am am conscious conscious of of being being in in pain, pain, but but I I do do not not form form the the thought thought "I "I am am in in pain" pain" or or otherwise otherwise ascribe ascribe the the predicate predicate "pain" "pain" to to myself. myself. Also, Also, interpreting interpreting my my consciousness consciousness of of being being in in pain pain as as the the fact fact that that I I would would assent assent to to "I "I am am in in pain," pain," if if asked, asked, would would be. be. blatantly blatantly arbitrary, arbitrary, since since there there are are many many things things besides besides assent assent ing ing to to "I "I am am in in pain" pain" which which someone someone in in pain pain would would natu natu rally rally (be (be ready ready to) to) do, do, e.g., e.g., screaming screaming and and writhing. writhing.
Additionally, Additionally, we we may may note note that that Frey's Frey's argument argument here here would would lead lead to to the the conclusion conclusion that that animals animals are are not not conscious. conscious.
Notice Notice that that in in the the above above citation citation Frey's' Frey's' analysis analysis of of self-con self-con sciousness sciousness in in terms terms of of ascribing ascribing P-predicates P-predicates to to oneself oneself is is said said to to E&A E&A IV/2 IV/2 apply apply not not only only to to simple simple desires desires but but to to "such "such things things as as thoughts, thoughts, feelings, feelings, memories, memories, and and perceptions." perceptions."
If If all all such such things things are are beyond beyond the the capacities capacities of of non-language non-language users, users, saying, saying, as as Frey Frey does,21 does,21 that, that, nonetheless, nonetheless, they they are are still still conscious conscious would would seem seem to to be be devoid devoid of of content. content.
How How can can one one be be conscious, conscious, if if one one cannot cannot perceive, perceive, feel, feel, desire, desire, remember, remember, think, think, or or believe? believe?
Furthermore, Furthermore, Frey Frey seems seems to to presume presume that that to to be be conscious conscious of of X X involves involves ascribing ascribing predicates predicates to to X X (or (or bei bei ng ng ready ready to to assent assent to to sentences sentences ascribing ascribing predicates predicates to to Xl. Xl. Why Why else else would would he he presume presume that that being being self-con self-con scious scious involves involves ascribing ascribing P-predicates P-predicates to to oneself? oneself? Additionally, Additionally, Frey's Frey's argu argu ment ment is is based based on on an an analysis analysis of of the the requi requi rements rements for for the the meani meani ngful ngful ascription ascription of of any any sort sort of of predicate, predicate, for for it it is is based based on on an an analysis analysis of of what what makes makes language language in in general general meaningful. meaningful. Frey Frey does does not not give give us us any any reason reason to to believe believe that that bei bei ng ng conscious conscious of of oneself oneself is is essentially essentially tied tied to to linguistic linguistic ability ability while while being being conscious conscious of of other other things things is is not, not, and and on on the the su su dace dace of of it, it, at at least, least, feeling feeling pain pain does does not not seem seem to to be be intimately intimately tied tied to to language language while while see see ing ing colors colors and and hearing hearing noises noises are are not. not. Consequently, Consequently, if if Frey's Frey's a a rgument rgument were were sound, sound, only only language language users users could could be be conscious, conscious, which which would, would, since since Frey Frey maintains maintains that that animals animals lack lack linguistic linguistic ability, ability, exclude exclude animals animals from from being being conscious. conscious.
Apparently, Apparently, Frey Frey is is strongly strongly opposed opposed to to denying denying that that ani ani mals mals are are conscious, conscious, since since he he adamantly adamantly rejects rejects the the suggestion suggestion that that he he is is denying denying consciousness consciousness to to animals; animals; so, so, unless unless Frey Frey can can show show that that being being con con scious scious of of oneself oneself requires requires linguistic linguistic ability ability while while being being conscious conscious of of other other things things does does not, not, we we have have a a reductio reductio of of Frey's Frey's position position here here which which he he would would have have to to accept accept as as discrediting discrediting his his attempt attempt to to deny deny that that animals animals can can have have simple simple desi desi res. res. Since Since in in our our ordinary ordinary dealings dealings with with infants, infants, pets, pets, and and other other non-language non-language using using animals animals we we successfully successfully deal deal with with them them as as desiring desiring beings beings who who take take an an interest interest in in what what pleases pleases and and pains pains them them and and as as sentient sentient beings beings with with affective affective needs, needs, some some of of which which they they take take an an interest interest in in and and some some of of which which they they merely merely have have an an interest interest in, in, the the bu bu rden rden of of proof proof is is su su rely rely on on Frey Frey and and others others who who would would deny deny that that animals animals can can have have desires desires or or that that the the interests interests of of animals animals cannot cannot be be significantly significantly dis dis tinguished tinguished from from the the needs needs of of plants plants and and other other non-feeling non-feeling things. things.
Since Since Frey Frey has has failed failed to to shoulder shoulder that that bur bur den, den, we we may may continue continue to to rely rely on on ordi ordi nary nary experience experience and and to to hold hold that that ani ani mals mals have have affective affective needs needs and and that that they they have have complex complex and and simple simple desi desi res res concerning concerning the the fulfillment fulfillment or or frustra frustra tion tion of of those those needs, needs, as as well well as as desi desi res res concerning concerning things things that that are are not not really really in in thei thei r r best best interest, interest, such such as as playing playing in in the the street. street.
It It follows follows that that both both horns horns of of Frey's Frey's dilemma dilemma are are blunt blunt and and harmless, harmless, for for whether whether one one analyzes analyzes "interests" "interests" in in terms terms of of having having an an interest interest or or taking taking an an interest, interest, animals animals meet meet the the interest interest requirement requirement for for hav hav ing ing moral moral rights. rights. 22 Ibid., Ibid., Since Since Frey's Frey's book book appeared, appeared, Tom Tom Regan, Regan, the the animal animal rightist rightist Frey Frey is is primarily primarily addressing addressing at at this this point point in in his his argument, argument, has has embraced embraced the the idea idea that that non-sentient non-sentient beings, beings, such such as as trees trees and and rivers, rivers, (can) (can) have have moral moral rights rights (see (see Regan's Regan's "The "The Nature Nature and and Possibility Possibility of of an an Envi Envi ronmental ronmental Ethic, Ethic, " " Environmental Environmental Ethics Ethics 111/1 111/1 (1981)). (1981) One One of of the the referees referees for for this this paper paper offered offered the the following following as as an an objection objection to to this this interpretation interpretation of of hav hav ing ing an an interest: interest:
The The following following is is unlikely unlikely but but not not inconceivable: inconceivable: by by per per formi formi ng ng operation operation 0 0 on on P P we we can can cut cut his his intelligence intelligence in in half half but but not not affect affect p's p's feelings feelings of of well-being. well-being. According According to to your your analysis analysis of of having having an an interest, interest, performing performing the the operation operation on on P P is is neither neither in in nor nor not not in in pIS pIS interest. interest. If If we we lived lived in in a a Brave Brave New New World World in in which which our our intelligence intelligence could could be be halved halved without without this this reducing reducing our our opportuni opportuni ties ties for for pleasu pleasu re re and and fulfillment, fulfillment, with with out out leaving leaving us us more more vulnerable vulnerable to to abuse abuse and and unhappiness, unhappiness, without without caus caus ing ing anxiety anxiety before before the the operation operation and and frustration frustration and and depression depression afterwards, afterwards, and and so so forth, forth, then then such such an an operation operation would would not not be be either either in in or or against against our our intertests. intertests.
But But we we do do not not live live in in such such a a world; world; in in our our world, world, intelli intelli gence gence is is something something we we both both enjoy enjoy exercising exercising and and find find a a necessary necessary tool tool for for attaining attaining other other enjoyments enjoyments and and fu fu Ifi Ifi IIments, IIments, wh wh ich ich is is what what rna rna kes kes being being intelligent intelligent in in our our interest interest in in our our world. world. What What is is valuable valuable in in our our world world might might not not be be valuable valuable in in a a vastly vastly dif dif ferent ferent world; world; that that should should not not surprise surprise anyone, anyone, but but it it should should discourage discourage the the practice practice of of trying trying to to refute refute moral moral phi phi losophies losophies by by developing developing science science fiction fiction examples. examples.
It It might might be be objected objected that that my my interpretation interpretation of of having having an an interest interest is is still still too too weak, weak, because because "interest" "interest" has has a a prescriptive prescriptive component component which which I I have have not not acknowledged. McCloskey McCloskey has has since since repudiated repudiated this this interpretation interpretation of of "interest," "interest," acknowledging acknowledging that that there there is is greater greater flexibility flexibility in in the the use use of of "interest" "interest" than than he he had had earlier earlier recog recog nized nized (see (see McCloskey's McCloskey's "Moral "Moral Rights Rights and and Animals," Animals," Inquiry Inquiry XXII/1-2 XXII/1-2 (1979)). (1979)).
Consequently, Consequently, it it seems seems unnecessary unnecessary to to defend defend my my interpreta interpreta tion tion of of having having an an interest interest against against an an objection objection based based on on McCloskey's McCloskey's earlier earlier analysis analysis of of "interest." "interest."
Let Let me me just just E&A E&A IV/2 IV/2 say say that that where where there there is is a a prescriptive prescriptive component component to to "X "X is is in in P's P's interest," interest," it it can can be be adequately adequately interpreted interpreted as as "if "if he he could could take take an an interest interest in in X, X, P P should should do do so." so." In In cases cases where where that that conditional conditional phrase phrase is is clearly clearly met, met, say say ing ing that that X X is is in in P's P's interest interest may may have have di di rect rect prescriptive prescriptive significance. significance. In In cases cases where where that that conditional conditional ph ph rase rase is is not not met, met, as as in in some some cases cases concerning concerning infants, infants, animals, animals, and and the the infirm, infirm, the the prescriptive prescriptive component component remains remains sub sub junctive. junctive. (1972-73). (1972-73) .
I I would would like like to to thank thank one one of of the the referees referees of of this this paper paper for for drawing drawing my my attention attention to to this this excellent excellent article. article. 14 14 In In the the previously previously noted noted article, article, Malcolm Malcolm carefully carefully distinguishes distinguishes between between "thinking "thinking that," that," which which does does not not require require linguistic linguistic ability, ability, and and "having "having the the thought thought that," that," which which does does require require linguistic linguistic ability. ability.
Frey Frey does does not not draw draw a a similar similar distinction distinction between between "believing "believing that" that" and and "having "having the the belief belief that," that," nor nor could could he he add add such such a a dis dis tinction tinction to to his his analysis analysis in in order order to to escape escape some some of of the the objections objections being being raised raised here. here. This This is is because because it it would would follow follow from from deploying deploying such such a a distinc distinc tion tion while while continuing continuing to to insist insist that that desiring desiring requires requires linguistic linguistic ability ability that that one one can can desire desire something something only only when when one one has has the the relevant relevant beliefs beliefs about about it. it.
But But that that is is clearly clearly false, false, for for I I can can certainly certainly desire desire something, something, e.g., e.g., that that a a long-winded long-winded speaker speaker should should finish, finish, without without having having the the belief belief that, that, for for example, example, "he "he has has not not stopped stopped talking" talking" or or "I "I would would be be happier happier if if he he would would stop stop talking." talking." In In order order to to desire desire that that the the speaker speaker cease cease talking, talking, I I need need only only believe believe such such things things (if (if believing believing is is required required at at all); all); I I need need not not actually actually have have (entertain, (entertain, formulate, formulate, express express to to myself) myself) such such beliefs. beliefs.
Consequently, Consequently, Frey Frey cannot cannot benefit benefit from from Malcolm's Malcolm's analysis analysis of of ordinary ordinary language; language; he he must must somehow somehow discredit discredit that that analysis. analysis. 89-90. 89-90. 19 19 Just Just in in case case someone someone might might be be tempted tempted to to counter counter that that "false "false belief" belief" is is just just convenient convenient shorthand shorthand for for referring referring to to believing believing that that some some sen sentence tence is is false, false, we we may may quickly quickly note note that that that that is is not not the the case. case.
We We can can falsely falsely believe believe that that something something is is true true and and truly truly believe believe that that something something is is false. false.
The The true/false true/false predicate predicate attaching attaching to to the the belief belief need need not not be be the the same same as as that that employed employed in in expressing expressing what what is is believed; believed; so, so, the the former former can cannot not be be just just a a shorthand shorthand reference reference to to the the latter. latter. It It might might also also be be countered countered that that Frey Frey could could escape escape this this objection objection by by again again referring referring to to his his interpreting interpreting believing believing in in terms terms of of what what one one would would assent assent to, to, if if asked. asked.
However, However, that that interpretation interpretation would would leave leave us us predi predicating cating truth truth and and falsity falsity of of disposi dispositions, tions, readinesses, readinesses, or or what-one what-onewould-do's, would-do's, which which would would be be very very strange, strange, to to say say the the least. least. So, So, rather rather than than that that interpretation interpretation providing providing an an escape escape from from this this objection, objection, it it would would seem seem that that predicating predicating truth truth and and falsity falsity of of beliefs beliefs provides provides another another reductio reductio of of that that interpretation. interpretation. I I would would like like to to thank thank all all three three Ethics Ethics & & Animals Animals referees referees of of my my paper paper for for many many helpful helpful suggestions suggestions and and crit criticisms icisms and and the the editor editor of of this this journal journal for for the the opportunity opportunity to to expand expand my my paper paper to to benefit benefit from from those those sugges suggestions tions and and criticisms. criticisms. 
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